AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS AS LEGAL AGENTS:
DIRECTLY BY THE RECOGNITION OF
PERSONHOOD OR INDIRECTLY BY THE
ALCHEMY OF ALGORITHMIC ENTITIES
DALTON POWELL†

ABSTRACT
At its core, agency law governs fiduciary relationships
between two distinct parties (the principal and agent) in
interactions with third parties. The three separate relationships
within agency (principal-agent, agent-third party, and principalthird party) create binding legal rights and obligations. To be a
principal or agent, one must be a person. The Restatement
(Third) of Agency’s definition of person attempts to distinguish
legally recognized persons from purely organizational entities
and mere instrumentalities. The emergence of AI computing, and
the ongoing development of truly autonomous computer systems,
will test traditional agency law with questions like who or what
can be a person. At present, the Restatement views computer
programs as mere instrumentalities of the using person and thus
not a separate person capable of being a principal or agent. This
Note will analyze the tension created within agency law’s
definition of personhood by the existence of autonomous systems.
These autonomous systems can be persons in two ways: either as
a direct person that is independent or as an indirect person that
is formed by an algorithmic entity. This definitional outcome of
personhood for autonomous systems determines whether
autonomous computer programs can be principals or agents—a
proposition that has monumental downstream implications
beyond the scope of this Note but ripe for future research.
Ultimately, this Note advocates for the acceptance of
autonomous systems as legally recognized persons for the
purposes of agency law. This recognition of personhood for
autonomous systems should be direct and based on the
acceptance that personhood depends on the moral recognition of
autonomy; but, at the very least, recognition of personhood
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should be indirect and based on the traditional recognition of
organizations as legal persons. Pragmatic benefits of
recognizing the personhood of autonomous systems support both
the direct and indirect acceptance of such personhood.

INTRODUCTION
Agency law encompasses three-party legal relationships where
one person—the principal—manifests assent that another person—the
agent—has the power to affect the principal’s legal relations with third
parties through the agent’s acts.1 Each of these relationships requires that
both parties to the relationship be a person.2 In agency law, the term
agency is precisely used to describe the “fiduciary relationship that arises
when one person . . . manifests assent to another person . . . that the agent
shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control,
and the agent manifests assent . . . to act.”3 This definition differs from
the colloquial, non-legal meaning of the word agency, with one such
definition being “a person or thing through which power is exerted or an
end is achieved.”4 Importantly, the legal definition of agency
significantly differs from the economic definition of agency as “a
contract under which one or more persons . . . engage another person . . .
to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some
decision-making authority to the agent.”5 Unlike the economic definition
of agency, the legal definition does not require a contract or the
delegation of decision-making, so legal agency can be broader than
economic agency.6 Notably, the legal, economic, and one colloquial
definitions of agency require the existence of at least two separate
persons.

1

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
Id. (“As defined by the common law, the concept of agency posits a consensual
relationship in which one person . . . acts as a representative of or otherwise acts
on behalf of another person . . . .”).
3
Id. at § 1.01.
4
Agency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https:// www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/agency (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
5
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308
(1976).
6
Compare id. with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §1.01. Note that the two
definitions are incongruous, so economic agency relationships can also exist
where legal agency relationships do not.
2
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Because personhood is a necessary element of legal agency, the
definition of personhood is critical to the analysis of any possible agency
relationship. Generally, personhood is an easily satisfied element.7 The
emergence of artificial intelligence (“AI”) and the possibility of
autonomous systems being agents or principals, serving in such capacity
independent from human involvement, complicates the personhood
definition. Commenters have theoretically explored this definitional
question for over a quarter of a century.8 These previously theoretical
complications of the personhood definition have become practical
questions in the current technological environment, especially with the
near possibility of fully autonomous cars.9
Section II of this Note sets out the relevant doctrine of the
Restatement (Third) of Agency regarding personhood. Section III
discusses the current technological environment of autonomous systems
and highlights the development of algorithmic entities—a possible
organizational structure response to the traditional non-recognition of
computer programs as persons. Section IV outlines why autonomous
programs should be recognized, either directly or at least indirectly, as
persons in agency. Section V concludes by flagging downstream
implications and issues for future research if the autonomous systems are
recognized as persons in agency law.

7

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §1.01 cmt. c (using examples like the
employee-employer to describe the “wide and diverse range of relationships”
encompassed by agency).
8
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70
N.C.L.R. 1231 (1992) (stating that the question of AI as a legal person “is only
theoretical” but still addressing the question in a 50-page law review article).
9
See Alex Davies, The Wired Guide to Self-Driving Cars, WIRED (December
13, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/guide-self-driving-cars/ (“In the past
five years, [partially] autonomous driving has gone from ‘maybe possible’ to
‘definitely possible’ to ‘inevitable’ to ‘how did anyone ever think that wasn’t
inevitable?’ to ‘now commercially available.’”). For an example of how AI and
self-operating machines creates similar stresses on possible tort liability, see also
Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona,
Where Robots Roam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/uber-driverless-fatality.html
(describing an incident where a test drive of an semi-autonomous car, which was
still under the supervision of a human in the driver’s seat, struck and killed a
pedestrian in Arizona and how the incident highlights necessitates a regulatory
response to liability for similar incidents).
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I must note the specific use of certain terms here. “Autonomous
system” refers to non-human computer systems that, once created, can
operate in undefined environments and react to unanticipated stimuli,10
and my analysis will primarily focus on whether these autonomous
systems should be persons under the Restatement (Third) of Agency. I
purposefully avoid the use of the term “computer program” to reflect the
technical usage of “autonomous systems.” These two terms are not
interchangeable or analogous. While autonomous systems typically
incorporate computer programs, not every computer program rises to the
level of an autonomous system.

I.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY: DEFINITION OF
PERSONHOOD

Fortunately, the Restatement (Third) of Agency has provided a
definition of person11 and extensive commentary to support this
definition.12 For the purposes of agency, a person is (1) an individual, (2)
an organization that “has legal capacity to possess rights and incur
obligations,” (3) a governmental entity, or (4) any other entity that “has
legal capacity to possess rights and incur obligations.”13 The guiding
principle underlying each of these categories of person is the “capacity to
be the holder of legal rights and the object of legal duties.”14
Capacity to be the holder of legal rights and the object of legal
duties is clarified by references to the Restatement (Third) of Agency
sections outlining the capacity to serve as a principal or agent.15 In
defining legally recognized persons’ capacity as principals, the
Restatement differentiates between individuals and non-individuals.16
The “law applicable” to non-individuals governs the capacity of nonindividuals.17 The legal capacity of persons who are entities, like
corporations, is governed by “the legal regime by virtue of which such

10

For a discussion on the technical use of the term “autonomous system,” see
infra notes 35–38 and the accompanying text.
11
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04.
12
Id. at § 1.04 cmt. e.
13
Id. at § 1.04.
14
Id. at § 1.04 cmt. e.
15
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 3.04–3.05).
16
Id. at § 3.04 (addressing individuals in paragraph (1) and non-individuals in
paragraph (2)).
17
Id. at § 3.04(2).
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person exists . . . and functions.”18 For example, a Delaware
corporation’s capacity as principal would be determined by the Delaware
corporate law that enabled the corporation’s creation. The Restatement
also differentiates between individuals and non-individuals in
determining whether actors have capacity as an agent.19 Non-individuals’
ability to act as an agent depends on “the law through which the agent
has legal personality.”20 Like the prior example in the context of a
principal, a Delaware corporation’s capacity as an agent would be
determined by the Delaware corporate law.
This quality of capacity to hold rights and be subject to duties
distinguishes legally recognized persons—whether individuals or nonindividuals—from purely organizational entities and mere legally
consequential instrumentalities.21 Because characterization as purely
organizational entities or mere legally consequential instrumentalities
precludes personhood, such a characterization also precludes the ability
to act as an agent or principal. Purely organizational entities are entities,
like trusts or estates, that cannot be “directly the object of liabilities and
the holder of rights.”22 Animals or inanimate objects are prototypical
examples of merely consequential instrumentalities that a person uses to
alter his, her, or its own legal rights and obligations.23
Characterization as a merely consequential instrumentality is the
more significant possible limitation on personhood than characterization
as a purely organizational entity.24 The reporter’s note cites a case in
which dogs are characterized as instrumentalities when used as a
dangerous weapon for purposes of an armed-robbery statute.25 Another
case describes dogs as non-persons who are thus unable to be subject to
suit.26 The cases summarized in the notes generally deny sentient animals
the possibility of personhood even while recognizing that animals are

18

Id. at § 3.04 cmt. d.
Id. at § 3.05 cmt. b.
20
Id.
21
Id. at §1.04 reporter’s n. e.
22
Id.
23
Id. at § 1.04 cmt. e.
24
See id. at § 1.04 reporter’s n. e (devoting one sentence to explain the relevance
of purely organizational entities and three full paragraphs to specific analysis of
mere legally consequential instrumentalities).
25
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 326 N.E.2d 710 (Mass. 1975)).
26
Id. (citing Dye v. Wargo, 253 F.3d 296 (7th Cir. 2001)).
19
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complex beings with independent purposes, desires, and aversions.27 The
Restatement’s approach sets some threshold level of autonomy that
separates persons from “inanimate objects or a nonhuman animal.”28
The Restatement also clearly states that “a computer program is
not capable of acting as a principal or an agent.”29 The Restatement
supports the general statement that computers are incapable of being an
agent with a quote that computer programs are not juridical persons.30
The Restatement and the cited article both reference electronic agents,
computer programs without independent volition and designed as tools
for their users, as a key example of why computers cannot be agents.31
The Restatement classifies computer programs as “instrumentalities of
the persons who use them.”32 Despite the clear initial statement of the
incapability of personhood and classification of computer programs as
instrumentalities, subsequent discussion of computer programs cracks the
door for the future personhood of computer programs by qualifying the
instrumentality classification to computer programs available “[a]t
present.”33

27

Id. (quoting CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS I at 98–99 (1985)) (“[W]hile Descartes ‘saw animals as
complex machines,’ they are in fact subjects to whom we can attribute
‘purposes, desires, aversions . . . in a strong, original sense . . . [t]hat the cat is
stalking the bird is not a derivative, or observer-relative fact about it.’”).
28
See id. at § 1.04 cmt. e (clearly distinguishing persons from inanimate objects
or nonhuman animals).
29
Id.
30
Id. at §1.04 reporter’s n. e (citing Joseph Sommer, Against Cyber-Law, 15
BERK. TECH. L.J. 1145, 1177–78 (2000)).
31
See id. (describing an electronic agent only as “the tool of the person who uses
it” without independent volition); Joseph Sommer, Against Cyber-Law, 15
BERK. TECH. L.J. 1145, 1177–78 (2000) (stating that a programmed machine is
“not a juridical person and therefore cannot be an agent” because it owes no
duties, lacks volition due to only following its internal programming, lacks
capacity for suit, and has no interests of its own).
32
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. e.
33
Id.
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AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

Before exploring the possible personhood of autonomous
systems at present, a brief survey of the state of computing is necessary.
The autonomy displayed by autonomous systems supports the moral
justification for the recognition of direct personhood. Additionally,
indirect personhood might also be recognized by creatively structuring
organizational entities. These entity structures are called algorithmic
entities. Conceptually, algorithmic entities are shells of personhood
through which the autonomous systems direct the shell persons’ actions.
Professor Shawn Bayern recently proposed such a shell using LLCs and
the governing LLC law to wrap autonomous systems in personhood.34

A.

The Current State of Autonomous System Technology

One recognized foreign research institute focusing on artificial
intelligence research35 defines autonomous systems as “autonomous
artifacts [like self-driving cars or smart robots] or large-scale selfmanaging systems consisting of physical infrastructure and software that,
together with humans, provide increased functionality, sustainability, and
efficiency for society.”36 Autonomous systems “must be capable of
planning and executing complex functions as intended, with limited

34

See generally Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity
Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93
(2015).
35
The Wallenberg Artificial Intelligence, Autonomous Systems and Software
Program. This program is “a major national initiative [in Sweden] for
strategically motivated basic research, education, and faculty recruitment in
autonomous systems and software development.” WASP, About,
https://web.archive.org/web/20190331204903/https://waspsweden.org/research/overview-of-autonomous-systems-area/ (last visited Apr.
20, 2019).
36
WASP, Overview of the Autonomous Systems and Software Area,
https://wasp-sweden.org/research/overview-of-autonomous-systems-area/ (last
visited Apr. 20, 2019); see also NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, Program
Solicitation for National Artificial Intelligence (AI) Research Institutes:
Accelerating Research, Transforming Society, and Growing the American
Workforce, https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2020/nsf20503/nsf20503.htm#summary
(last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (defining the broader concept of artificial intelligence
as enabling computers to “perform tasks that have historically required human
cognition and human decision-making abilities” and exercising “thought and
intelligent behavior”).
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human intervention, operating in uncertain and unstructured physical
and/or information environments, and managing unexpected external or
internal events.”37 This reactivity to unanticipated stimuli “distinguishes
[autonomous systems] from mere automated systems, which also are able
to execute complex functions, but which mostly assume structured
environments [and] have limited capacity to learn and adapt to
unexpected events.”38
The technical definition used by autonomous system and
software development researchers suggests that computing has moved
past the law. This technical definition contemplates complex systems,
not just the simple computer programs that caused the Restatement’s
initial skepticism of computer programs as agents.39 The Restatement’s
consideration of computer programs, and resulting skepticism, appears to
be based solely on automated systems.40
Examples of autonomous systems are readily available in society
today.41 The most prevalent examples of autonomous systems are
“tangible instantiations” like robotics and automatic driving that are
meant to “replace or complement the human’s capacity to manage
complexity.”42 Specific examples include Uber-CMU partnerships in
autonomous driving; Nissan-NASA Ames partnerships in autonomous
taxis; Volvo’s and Scania’s developments in self-driving trucking; the
Google-Nest partnership possibly leading to autonomous HVAC
systems; and Apple’s own developments in smart home control.43 Selfmanaging data centers are information system instantiations of
autonomous systems.44 These self-managing data centers “use control,

37

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
39
Compare id. with Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.04, comment e. (citing
Sommer, supra note 31).
40
See Sommer, supra note 31 (“[A programmed machine] simply responds to its
internal programming and external parameters.”).
41
WASP, supra note 38 (“There are now numerous industrial examples showing
the tremendous potential and positive impact of technologies arising from the
use of autonomous systems and their integration in information systems.”).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
38
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machine learning, and data analytics techniques to master architectural
and operation complexity.”45
Autonomous system technology advancement is also relevant in
the public sphere due to publicly funded technological development,
regulation of new technologies, and the importance of new technologies
to national security. Government research is currently creating
autonomous systems. For example, NASA is researching a “wide range
of areas, such as artificial intelligence, advanced flight control laws, new
testing methods, collision avoidance technologies, and much more” that
use autonomous systems to produce “lifesaving collision avoidance
technologies” applicable to the operation of aviation and non-aviation
vehicles.46 Regulation is already adjusting to autonomous systems. The
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issued a statement
regarding automated vehicles in which the agency provided
recommended principles for state regulation of driverless vehicle
operation and outlined the agency’s own regulatory research programs.47
In its definition of vehicle automation, the agency recognized and
segmented the broad range of vehicle autonomy by the vehicle’s ability
to act independently from humans.48 Finally, AI development is, and will
continue to be, a key national government policy as the United States
seeks to remain globally competitive with other countries that develop
“more comprehensive plans to support homegrown AI industries.”49
The clear delineation between autonomous systems and
automated systems50 and readily observable technological advances in

45

Id.
Lee Obringer, Autonomous Systems, NASA (Apr. 28, 2017),
https://www.nasa.gov/feature/autonomous-systems (listing ten different
technology projects upon which NASA is working).
47
NHTSA, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED
VEHICLES,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Automated_Vehicles_Policy.p
df.
48
Id.
49
See BLOOMBERG, Opinion, Trump’s AI Plan is a Good Start (Feb. 15, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-15/artificial-intelligencetrump-s-smart-american-ai-initiative.
50
See supra notes 35–40 and the accompanying text.
46
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autonomous systems51 indicate that it is time for the law to recognize and
respond to the important difference between autonomy and automation.

B.

Algorithmic Entities

Advanced autonomous systems paired with limited liability
companies that have no individual members, collectively called
algorithmic entities, could be a sufficient development enabling
autonomous systems to attain legal personhood for the purposes of
agency law.52 This legal personhood would not be direct personhood for
the autonomous system, but indirect personhood for the autonomous
system through “the opportunity to control an entity that is a legal person
without potential interference from those preexisting entities that
established the legal person.”53
The process by which an algorithmic entity is created utilizes the
flexibility of state LLC statutes to place the autonomous system in
control of a separate LLC. Professor Bayern suggests two possible
methods to create algorithmic entities.54 It is important to note than LLC
statutes are easily amendable and state legislatures can adjust their
respective LLC statutes to prevent the creation of algorithmic entities. So
both of Bayern’s suggested methods, and any other algorithmic entity
creation methods, are vulnerable to legislative change.55 LLC statutes
are unique to each state, so the creation of an algorithmic entity will
depend on the specific state law. For Bayern’s suggestions, he primarily
analyzes the possible creation methods under the Revised Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act.56
In the first method, an existing person establishes a membermanaged LLC, the person creates an operating agreement governing the
LLC’s conduct which states that the LLC will act as determined by the

51

See supra notes 41–49 and the accompanying text.
See Lynn M. Lopucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 890
(2018) (citing Bayern, supra note 34, at 104–05) (“In two recent articles,
Professor Shawn Bayern demonstrated that anyone can confer legal personhood
on an autonomous computer program merely by putting it in control of a limited
liability company (LLC).”).
53
See Bayern, supra note 34, at 104–05.
54
See id. at 101–02, 104–05 n.43.
55
See id. at 104 (“Of course, if legislatures do not like [the possibility of
algorithmic entities], they can easily amend the LLC acts to prevent it.”).
56
Id. at 101–03.
52
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autonomous system, and the sole member withdraws from the LLC. 57
The sole member’s withdrawal likely will not cause the LLC to enter
dissolution, thus creating a perpetual entity managed solely by the
autonomous system.58 Specifically in New York, the LLC statute
provides LLC operating agreement drafters with drafting discretion
regarding how long the entity need not have a member.59 This chosen
time period could theoretically be such a significant length of time as to
be practically perpetual.60
In the second method, an existing person creates two membermanaged LLCs, the person creates identical operating agreements for
both LLCs which state that the LLC will act as determined by the
autonomous system, the existing person causes each LLC to be admitted
as a member of the other entity, and the sole human member withdraws
from both LLCs.61 This method would create a perpetual algorithmic
entity—where the first method might not—if the specific state LLC
statute requires every LLC to have a member or prescribes mandatory
LLC dissolution procedures upon withdrawal of the final member.
An algorithmic entity would have the rights, as specified by state
law, “to own property, to enter into contracts, to be represented by
counsel, to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, to equal
protection of the laws, to speak freely, and to spend money on political
campaigns.”62 Autonomous systems will likely be capable of exercising
sufficient autonomous judgment to effectively operate algorithmic
entities in the near future.63

57

Id. at 101.
See id. at 102 (“[I]t is important to recognize that under many modern LLC
acts, the sole member's dissociation from the LLC does not require that the LLC
terminate its existence. Indeed, many acts specifically contemplate at least the
temporary continuation of a memberless LLC because this is a convenient
option in several practical cases, such as estate planning.”).
59
Id. at 103 (citing N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 701(a)(4) (1999)).
60
Id. (“The statute permits, for example, the operating agreement to provide for
a million year period during which the LLC needn’t have members.”).
61
Id. at 104, n.43.
62
Lopucki, supra note 52, at 890–91 (citations omitted).
63
See id. at 891 (stating that “[m]ost commentators believe that algorithms . . .
can run profitable businesses,” that commentators have proposed such entities in
various industries like electronic data storage, bike rental, online gambling,
58
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AUTONOMOUS PROGRAMS SHOULD BE TREATED AS
LEGALLY RECOGNIZED PERSONS

Autonomous systems can be persons in two ways: either as a
direct person that is autonomous or as an indirect person that is formed
by an algorithmic entity. The distinction between direct and indirect
personhood depends on whether the rights and obligations of an entity
are independent from an external reference. An entity is a direct person if
it does not require an external reference to determine its personhood. The
concept of independence from an external reference is best explained by
an example in which an external reference bestows personhood: the
algorithmic entity. In an algorithmic entity, the personhood of the
underlying autonomous system is dependent on the existence of the
separate LLC entity, which is the external reference. In direct
personhood, the Restatement would recognize the autonomous system
itself as a person; in indirect personhood, the Restatement would
recognize the LLC as a person.
An algorithmic entity’s treatment as a person within agency law
has not been determined, and, due to its unique characteristics, it can
arguably be granted or denied personhood based on the traditional
analysis provided by the Restatement. An algorithmic entity has
characteristics of a legal person, a purely organizational entity, and a
mere legally consequential instrumentality. Additionally, when ignoring
legal form, an autonomous entity is arguably only a computer program
masquerading as a legal person and thus possibly subject to the
Restatement commentary’s general skepticism about computer programs
as agents.
Ultimately, autonomous systems should be recognized as
persons in agency law and thus capable of being an agent or principal.
Autonomous systems should be recognized as direct persons, or, at the
very least, they should be recognized as indirect persons. Direct
personhood should be accepted based on the moral recognition that
personhood is inherently a determination of autonomy. Indirect
personhood should be accepted based on simple satisfaction of the
Restatement’s definition of person. Additionally, the pragmatic benefits

vending machines, and blockchain-based ventures, and that several start-ups are
already broaching this field) (citations omitted).
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resulting from the ability of autonomous systems to act as principals or
agents support both direct and indirect personhood.

A.

Direct Personhood

Moral arguments for the strong link between personhood and
autonomy support the direct recognition of autonomous systems as
persons. The core requirement of the personhood is the ability to
“directly” be the object of liabilities and the holder of rights.64 The use of
the word “directly” in the reporter’s note’s explanation of personhood is
a curious one. The word “directly” is not used in the definition of
person65 or in its relevant commentary66 and the word’s most appropriate
definition is from the source without interruption or diversion by an
intervenor.67 So, an entity is directly the object of liabilities and the
holder of rights if there are no intervenors between such entity and the
associated rights or obligations who are more appropriately subject to
such rights or obligations than the entity itself. There can be both
intervenors worthy of being subject to such rights or obligations and
intervenors unworthy of being subject to such rights or obligations. To
promote clarity, I have recharacterized this distinction as being a

64

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 reporter’s n. e (AM. LAW INST.
2006) (“For the purposes of the common law of agency, a ‘person’ must be one
who is directly the object of liabilities and the holder of rights.”).
65
Id. at § 1.04(5) (“A person is (a) an individual; (b) an organization or
association that has legal capacity to possess rights and incur obligations; (c) a
government, political subdivision, or instrumentality or entity created by
government; or (d) any other entity that has legal capacity to possess rights and
incur obligations.”).
66
Id. at § 1.04, cmt. e (“To be capable of acting as a principal or an agent, it is
necessary to be a person, which in this respect requires capacity to be the holder
of legal rights and the object of legal duties.”).
67
Direct, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (adverb subsenses b & c),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/direct (last visited Mar. 9, 2019)
(defining direct as “from the source without interruption or diversion” and
“without an intervening agency or step”). The word “directly” is used two other
times in § 1.04: (1) “directly to” in reporter’s note j; and (2) “direct from” in the
case citations by jurisdiction. These uses of the word, when paired with a
preposition, indicate the second subsense of the definition, id. (adverb subsense
b) (defining direct as “from the source without interruption or diversion”); so the
use of the word directly without a preposition indicates that the third subsense,
id. (adverb subsense c) (defining direct as “without an intervening agency or
step”), is most appropriate.
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distinction between means—unworthy intervenors—and ends—worthy
intervenors.
The analysis of direct personhood turns on determining whether
the entity is an end, and thus worthy of direct personhood, or a mean to a
separate end, and thus unworthy of direct personhood. The fact that the
distinction between means and ends is relevant to direct personhood
indicates that moral considerations, such as autonomy,68 are critical to
the characterization of personhood. Autonomous systems are morally
worthy of recognition as ends because they display sufficient levels of
autonomy, such a recognition is economically beneficial, and the systems
can be subject to ethical frameworks to guide their actions.
Autonomous systems are significantly more autonomous than
the automated systems that the Restatement commentary has determined
to be means, and are more worthy for recognition as ends. Autonomous
systems have progressed substantially in areas that are indicative of
autonomy, like sophisticated social interactivity,69 which might rise
above the autonomy threshold for personhood hinted at in the
Restatement.70 Startups are even currently creating AI, blockchains, and
augmented reality to develop programs intended to replace basic intimate
human relationships like romantic partners.71 This level of autonomy
shown by human social interactivity clearly exceeds the level of dogs

68

Here, autonomy is used to mean self-direction and independence. See
Autonomy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (sense 2), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/autonomy (last visited March 9th, 2019) (defining
autonomy as “self-directing freedom and especially moral independence”).
69
See Jaden Urbi & MacKenzie Sigalos, The Complicated Truth about Sophia
the Robot—An Almost Human Robot or a PR Stunt, CNBC (June 5, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/05/hanson-robotics-sophia-the-robot-pr-stuntartificial-intelligence.html (stating that “a sentient being . . . is the goal of some
developers” and that there are “a host of players pushing the limits of what
robots are capable of”); see, e.g., John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’:
Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/science/17jeopardy-watson.html.
70
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY at § 1.04 cmt. e; see also supra note
28 and the accompanying text.
71
See Shoji Yano, Virtual Girlfriend Rolls AI and Blockchain Tech into One,
NIKKEI BUS. REV. (June 6, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Virtualgirlfriend-rolls-AI-and-blockchain-tech-into-one (describing the startup Cougar
and its intent to create Virtual Human Agents that can be the customers’
girlfriend across all possible digital interfaces).

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

320

used in the Restatement illustrations.72 In the illustration, the dog is
trained to and performs the programmed task of retrieving beer from the
liquor store for his owner while the liquor store owner keeps a running
tab for the dog owner.73 Because of the structured environment—the path
to the liquor store and account charging process—and the dog’s limited
capacity to learn and adapt to unanticipated stimuli, this Restatement’s
illustration perfectly aligns with the technical definition of an automated
system as described earlier.74 The dog illustration, as an automated
system, is clearly distinguishable from an autonomous system. These
autonomous systems75 rise above what the Restatement commentary
outlines as mere means unworthy of personhood.76
The recognition of autonomous systems as ends, and thus direct
persons, is economically beneficial, which supports such a recognition.
The economist Paul Streeten’s article on means and ends in the context
of human development supports the characterization of autonomous
systems as ends and thus economically worthy of recognition as
persons.77 Streeten’s analysis touches on fundamental concepts of meansends determinations that are applicable in all scenarios.78 He highlights
two fundamental concepts for the recognition of something as an ends:
inherency and as a means to higher productivity.79 These two
fundamental concepts of recognizing ends might not be harmonious in all
instances, but they are harmonious where there are “rigid links” between

72

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY at § 1.04, reporter’s n. e.
Id.
74
See supra note 38 and the accompanying text.
75
See supra notes 69–71 and the accompanying text.
76
See supra notes 36–38 and the accompanying text.
77
Paul Streeten, Human Development: Means and Ends, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
232 (May 1994).
78
Cf. id. Streeten emphasizes six reasons that human development and poverty
eradication should be promoted. The first two are universal and applicable to all
ends-means determinations, while the final four—human reproductivity, the
impact on the physical environment, the reduction of poverty, and political
appeal—are specifically relevant to ends-means determinations for humans.
Because these final four reasons are not relevant the ends-means determinations
for autonomous systems, they will not be considered further.
79
Cf. id. (“First, and above all, it is an end itself, that needs no further
justification. . . . Second, it is a means to higher productivity.”).
73
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economic productivity and the inherent qualities of ends.80 One
important disharmony exists between the concepts when the inherency
approach views ends as “active, participating agents” and the means-ofhigher-productivity approach views ends as “targets.”81 For autonomous
systems, their economic productivity depends on their ability to perform
in undefined environments with unique, unanticipated stimuli, and their
level of autonomy inherently justifies characterization as an end. Here,
inherency and economic productivity both depend on autonomy, thus,
their autonomy acts as a “rigid link” that bridges the conceptual
disharmony noted by Steeten. Both the autonomous system’s inherency
and means to higher productivity support their recognition as ends.82
Their autonomy makes them active participating agents,83 andtheir
autonomy makes them targets worthy of recognition as ends because
they are economically productive.84
Moving beyond mere recognition of autonomous systems as
ends due to the ability to act intentionally and the economic benefits of
such recognition, the existence of the academic field of machine ethics
also supports the direct personhood of autonomous systems. There are
different schools of thought about what can be an artificial moral agent—
i.e., an artificial autonomous actor that possesses moral value and has
certain rights and responsibilities.85 But the ability to exercise
autonomous judgment makes such an entity an artificial moral agent
across all machine ethics conceptual approaches.86 Autonomous systems
possess such autonomous judgment and thus are ends that possess moral

80

Cf. id. (“The unity of interests would exist if there were rigid links between
economic production . . . and human development . . . .”).
81
Cf. id. at 234.
82
See supra notes 80–81 and the accompanying text.
83
Agent is used here in its philosophical context where the word “denote[s] the
performance of intentional actions.” Markus Schlosser, Agency, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/agency/.
84
See supra Part III.A. (describing the multitude of current productive
technological uses of autonomous systems).
85
See Robert James M. Boyles, Philosophical Signposts for Artificial Moral
Agent Frameworks, 6 SURI 92, 92–100 (2018) (defining briefly artificial moral
agents and then discussing the key concepts of three different conceptual
approaches to determining what constitutes an artificial moral agent),
https://philpapers.org/archive/BOYPSF.pdf.
86
See id.
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value and have certain rights and responsibilities. The application of
ethical requirements to something recognizes that it is an end and not a
mere means. Requirements that one act ethically and fulfill ethical
obligations are also similar to the ability to hold legal rights and
obligations—the core of personhood in agency law.
The field of machine ethics is “concerned with adding an ethical
dimension to machines” by “ensuring that the behavior of machines
towards human users and . . . other machines . . . is ethically
acceptable.”87 The stated ultimate goal of machine ethics “is to create a
machine that itself follows an ideal ethical principle or set of
principles.”88 The study of machine ethics is necessary for the
development of AI—which is an important development for autonomous
systems—and the imposition of ethical standards on AI is likely
necessary for widespread public acceptance of such technology.89
For the machine to be an ideal agent it must be an explicit ethical
agent that is “able to calculate the best action in ethical dilemmas using
ethical principles,” as opposed to an implicit ethical agent that is simply
programmed to behave ethically. 90 This level of judgment that could be
present in autonomous systems moves far beyond that contemplated by
the Restatement commentary when expressing skepticism about
computer programs or dogs as principals and agents, and supports the
direct personhood of autonomous systems. The Restatement commentary
practically attributes all computer program error to the user and imposes
no blame on the computer program itself.91 In the illustration where the
dog retrieves alcohol upon the instruction of its owner, the commentary
contemplates no ethical blameworthiness for the dog when it acts without

87

Michael Anderson & Susan Leigh Anderson, Machine Ethics: Creating an
Ethical Intelligent Agent, 28 AI MAG. 15, 15 (Winter 2007).
88
Id.
89
See id. at 16 (“[I]t could be argued that humans’ fear of the possibility of
autonomous intelligent machines stems from their concern about whether these
machines will behave ethically, so the future of AI may be at stake. Whether
society allows AI researchers to develop anything like autonomous intelligent
machines may hinge on whether they are able to build in safeguards against
unethical behavior.”).
90
Id. at 15 (citing James H. Moor, The Nature, Importance, and Difficulty of
Machine Ethics, 21 IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 18 (July/Aug. 2006)).
91
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
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the owner’s direction.92 While under machine ethics, the autonomous
program itself would bear ethical blame for any such wrongdoing in both
scenarios.93
Machines will likely be more ethical beings than humans,
making them more worthy of treatment as ends and direct persons than
humans, which are clearly accepted as ends capable of direct
personhood. Machines will not be subject to the “genetic predisposition
toward unethical behavior as a survival mechanism.”94 This unethical
genetic predisposition is present in human beings due to the evolutionary
promotion of the human instinct to survive at all costs.95 Any concern
that machines can start out behaving ethically and end up behaving
unethically stems more from concerns about human behavior than about
the possible ethical corruption of autonomous systems and AI.96
This recommended recognition of legal status in non-human
entities similar to that of humans—which inherently blurs the lines
between what is and what is not morally worthy of legal recognition—is
not novel just to agency law.97 The progress of technology towards “truly
artificial intelligences, with cognition and consciousness recognizably
similar to our own”98 and the creation of genetic chimeras—which
involves the splicing of different genetic materials to create new
biological creatures99—are also pressing once-clear distinctions between

92

See id.
See supra notes 88–90 and the accompanying text.
94
Anderson & Anderson, supra note 87, at 17 (citing Eric Dietrich, “After the
Humans Are Gone,” Keynote address presented at the 2006 North American
Computing and Philosophy Conference, RPI, Troy, NY (Aug. 12, 2006)).
95
Id.
96
See id. (“Most human beings are far from ideal models of ethical agents,
despite having been taught ethical principles; and humans do, in particular, tend
to favor themselves. Machines, though, might have an advantage over human
beings in terms of behaving ethically.”).
97
See James Boyle, Endowed by Their Creator? The Future of Constitutional
Personhood, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 9, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/0309_personhood_boyle.pdf.
98
Id. at 5 (quoting Rodney Brooks, I, Rodney Brooks, Am a Robot, 45 IEEE
SPECTRUM 71 (June 2008)).
99
Id. (providing examples of chimeras like bioluminescent tomato plants from
splicing fish and tomato DNA and onco-mice used in cancer research that are
the result of splicing mouse and human DNA).
93

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

324

the human and non-human.100 Much like “constitutional law will have to
classify artificially created entities that have some but not all of the
attributes we associate with human beings,” agency law will have similar
classification conundrums.101
The previously discussed focus on
determining direct personhood based on moral qualification as an end,
instead of the sole focus on rights and obligations, is one normative
theoretical approach to solving these conundrums. For direct personhood,
agency law should recognize the existence of autonomous judgment as
sufficient for personhood.

B.

Indirect Personhood

Because indirect personhood is determined by reference to the
LLC organization of an algorithmic entity, the analysis of an autonomous
system’s personhood in this context is straightforward. The LLC is a
well-known and traditional legal entity and only a traditional analysis
need be applied. This analysis focuses on the distinctions between legally
recognized persons, mere legally consequential instrumentalities, and
purely organizational entities.
Characterization of an autonomous system as a computer
program that is a mere legally consequential instrumentality poses a risk
to the personhood of algorithmic entities. If an algorithmic entity is truly
autonomous and no individuals are associated with the LLC, then an
algorithmic entity is clearly distinguishable from automated computer
systems, specifically referred to as electronic agents, discussed in the
Restatement’s reporter’s note.102 The fact that an autonomous system
directs the actions of the LLC displays volition not previously
contemplated by computer programs.103 The presence of the LLC entity
also removes any concern about the lack of a person who can be subject

100

Id.
Cf. id. at 6 (discussing the difficulty of classifying artificial entities in
constitutional law).
102
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 reporter’s n. e (AM. LAW INST.
2006). See also supra notes 35–40 and the accompanying text (differentiating
autonomous systems from automated systems).
103
Compare Lopucki, supra note 52, at 899 (“[A]n entity controlled by an
algorithm might be virtually indistinguishable from one controlled by
humans.”), with Sommer, supra note 31, at 1179 (“[The electronic agent] simply
responds to its internal programming and external parameters. Beyond its
programming and parameters, it cannot keep its user informed of transactions it
is processing, or problems that might be developing.”).
101
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to legal rights and obligations.104 The autonomy level of the autonomous
system will be a key factor in recognizing personhood even if the LLC’s
legal form is ignored—much like autonomy favors recognition of direct
personhood for the autonomous system.
The limitation of purely organizational entities not being persons
has traditionally only excluded trusts or estates,105 so the LLC as a
separate legal entity capable of possessing its own rights and obligations
likely precludes characterizing the algorithmic entity as a purely
organizational entity. There is a possible argument that the purpose of the
exclusion of purely organizational entities, like trusts and estates, is to
look past legal form and only recognize volitional actors, like trustees
and estate administrators, as persons. But the Restatement commentary
for purely organizational entities focuses primarily on direct capability of
having rights and obligations and not on volition.106
Ultimately, because the guiding principle of personhood
categorization is legal capacity107 and algorithmic entities have sufficient
legal rights,108 traditional Restatement analysis likely grants autonomous
algorithmic entities personhood as an entity that has legal capacity to
possess rights and incur obligations.109 Because the legal capacity of nonindividual agents and principals is determined by the law creating such
non-individual,110 state LLC statutes will determine the algorithmic
entity’s personhood. Such state LLC statutes enable the algorithmic

104

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 reporter’s n. e (quoting
Sommer, supra note 31).
105
Id. (“[T]he definition [of person] in black letter of this Restatement does not
include ‘any form of trust or estate.’”).
106
See id. (“For the purposes of the common law of agency, a ‘person’ must be
one who is directly the object of liabilities and the holder of rights.”).
107
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
108
See Lopucki, supra note 52, at 890–91 (stating that algorithmic entities
would have the right “to own property, to enter into contracts, to be represented
by counsel, to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, to equal protection
of the laws, to speak freely, and to spend money on political campaigns”).
109
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. e. (“To be capable of acting
as a principal or an agent, it is necessary to be a person, which in this respect
requires capacity to be the holder of legal rights and the object of legal duties.”).
110
See id. at § 3.04(2), § 3.05 cmt. b.
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entity to act like any other LLC or corporation capable of being an agent
or principal.111

C.

A Pragmatic Example

Policy arguments support both the moral-based justification for
the recognition of direct personhood and the doctrine-based justification
for the recognition of indirect personhood in autonomous systems.
Recognizing autonomous systems as persons capable of being agents or
principals can create immediate tangible benefits from AI improving
present-day society. One such example in the field of corporate
governance is autonomous systems revolutionizing the corporate
decision-making process.
Business is becoming increasingly complex, and autonomous
systems and their utilization of AI can augment, or even replace, the
human board of directors’ fallible judgments in this complex
environment. Artificial intelligence can be a characteristic of an
autonomous system.112 This improved corporate decision-making is one
pragmatic example that supports the need for agency law’s recognition of
personhood for autonomous systems. Commenters have also noted this
growing business complexity and suggested that the most appropriate
response to the complexity “will be to incorporate AI in the practice of
corporate governance and strategy.”113 Companies are already

111

Bayern, supra note 34, at 104 (“The end result is novel legal personhood—or
at least a functional analogue of it—without any ongoing commitment by, or
subservience to, a preexisting person.”).
112
Shani R. Else & Francis G. X. Pileggi, Corporate Directors Must Consider
Impact of Artificial Intelligence for Effective Corporate Governance, BUS. LAW
TODAY (Feb. 12, 2019), https:// businesslawtoday.org/2019/02/corporatedirectors-must-consider-impact-artificial-intelligence-effective-corporategovernance/ (defining AI generally as “the capacity of a computer or electronic
device to use characteristics associated with human intelligence, including
reasoning and learning from prior experiences”).
113
Barry Libert, Megan Beck & Mark Bonchek, AI in the Boardroom, MIT
SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Oct. 19, 2017), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/ai-inthe-boardroom-the-next-realm-of-corporate-governance (“The truth is that
business has become too complex and is moving too rapidly for boards and
CEOs to make good decisions without intelligent systems. We believe that the
solution to this complexity will be to incorporate AI in the practice of corporate
governance and strategy.”).
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implementing this suggestion.114 One Hong Kong venture capital firm
even integrated AI so deeply into its decision-making that the firm
“would not make positive investment decisions without corroboration by
[the AI system].”115 AI can augment or replace both strategic—typically
associated with board and C-suite decisions—and operational decisionmaking—typically associated with C-suite or lower management
decisions.116 The company’s success might even be wholly dependent on
such AI input.117 Overall, this improved decision-making will benefit
companies, shareholders, and society.
The commenters’ predictions about the impact level of the AI
underlying autonomous systems on corporate governance vary. Some
commenters limit the impact to simply “augmenting board intelligence
using AI” but not “automating leadership and governance.”118 These
augmentations would occur for strategic decisions—e.g., tracking capital
allocation, highlighting company performance relative to industry trends,
reviewing competitor press releases to identify potential new
competitors, etc.—and operational decisions—e.g., analyzing internal
communications to assess employee morale, predicting employee
turnover, or identifying subtle changes in customer preferences or
demographics.119 Other commenters predict that the autonomous systems
will assume a significant amount of management activity by noting that
“most duties in typical corporations will be automated within five to ten
years,” but they do not suggest that AI will fully assume all management

114

See Nicky Burridge, Artificial Intelligence Gets a Seat in the Boardroom,
NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (May 10, 2017), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Artificialintelligence-gets-a-seat-in-the-boardroom (describing a data scientist’s comment
that “AI is increasingly being used to support management decisions across
many sectors” and noting that many hedge funds and investment funds have
already started to use AI as a decision-making tool for risk analysis without
public announcement).
115
Id. (quoting the venture capital firm’s managing partner, Dmitry Kaminskiy).
116
See Libert, Beck & Bonchek, supra note 113 (“Artificial intelligence for both
strategic decision-making (capital allocation) and operating decision-making
will come to be an essential competitive advantage . . . .”).
117
See Burridge, supra note 114 (stating that the managing partner of a venture
capital firm believed “that the fund would have gone under without [the AI
system] because it would have invested in ‘overhyped projects’” and that the AI
“helped the board to make more logical decisions”).
118
Libert, Beck & Bonchek, supra note 113.
119
See id.
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actions.120 The same commenter even noted that decentralized
autonomous companies—companies able to operate without human
involvement—will exist in the near future. 121
One legal scholar has even gone so far as to suggest that AI
could assume all corporate management responsibilities, consequently
removing the need for human management.122 If such AI management
materializes, the scholar suggests that corporate governance might react
by moving from a multi-person collective board with a two-tier corporate
board and officer management model to a single “fused” management
model operated solely by the AI.123 The scholar further justifies this
management model shift by stating that the performance of the AI “will
be superior to today’s human-led governance.”124 The scholar argues
“that it is not an insurmountable step from AI generating and suggesting
expert decisions for managers (which in some areas is already common
today) to AI making these decisions autonomously.”125 The scholar
predicts that this fused management software will be offered either for
sale or hire by large commercial AI software providers.126 This full
assumption approach is not near practical implementation; even the
aforementioned venture capital firm that conditioned its investment
decisions on AI approval only treated the AI as “a member of [its] board
with observer status” and not as a full board member.127
Despite the clear beneficial role that autonomous systems can
have in corporate decision making as separate consultants or direct
decision-makers, their ability to fulfill this beneficial role will be limited
unless both agency law and corporate law recognize autonomous systems

120

Burridge, supra note 114 (stating that the interview subject, the managing
partner of a venture capital firm, believes that “corporate winners” will augment
human decisions by combining “smart machines with smart people” but will not
“fully replace people on boards of directors”).
121
See id. (providing an example of such a decentralized autonomous
company—a municipal-run taxi company that operates self-driving cars and
directs the car routes and maintenance via a computer algorithm).
122
Martin Petrin, Corporate Management in the Age of AI (Univ. Coll. London,
Working Paper No. 3, 2019) (forthcoming in COLUM. BUS. L. REV.),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3346722.
123
See id. at 4, 52–53.
124
Id. at 4.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
See Burridge, supra note 114.
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as capable decision-makers. Without agency law recognition, the
autonomous system-agent could not directly bind the corporationprincipal by the autonomous system’s decision. Without corporate law
recognition, the autonomous system is not duly authorized to serve the
corporation as a director-agent. One corporate law hurdle is the
requirement that directors be natural persons—i.e. human individuals.128
Similar natural person director limitations exist in other foreign
jurisdictions.129 Another corporate law hurdle is the prohibition on
directors delegating decision making duties to non-directors.130 The
corporate law hurdles can, and should, be overcome by recognizing that
autonomous systems are capable of being directors or advisors whom
directors can consult. The agency law hurdle can, and should, be
overcome by directly or indirectly recognizing the personhood of the
autonomous systems. Overall, granting legal recognition of AI as board
members or consultants, which allows AI to directly affect corporate
decision making, is a significant global issue.131 Society can directly and
immediately benefit if agency law recognizes the personhood of
autonomous systems that use AI.
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See Else & Pileggi, supra note 112 (“It is important to note, however, that in
Delaware board members must be ‘natural persons,’ so ‘appointing an AI
program’ as a board member for a Delaware corporation would be
impermissible.”) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2016)).
129
See, e.g., Teresa Kauppila, Is There Room on Your Board for AI?, LEXOLOGY
(Nov. 1, 2018), https:// www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d7339c3ac75a-45cc-be6e-92b24be924f8 (“There is one significant limitation to the use of
AI in boards of directors: in Finland, AI applications cannot be appointed as full
board members. The Limited Liability Companies Act does not explicitly state
the board members must be natural persons, but that is only because this has
been taken for granted. This issue has previously been discussed in connection
with whether a legal person could service as a board member, as is the case in
some countries.”).
130
See Else & Pileggi, supra note 112 (discussing the Delaware Chancery
Court’s decision in Canal Capital Corp. v. French, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 133, *5
and stating that, “[t]o the extent a board moves forward to adopt AI, it is crucial
that the board does not delegate its essential management functions and rely
solely upon AI in making decisions for the corporation. Doing so would be a
prohibited delegation of its duties”).
131
See Kauppila, supra note 129 (“Today, the global discussion has moved on to
whether an AI could be a full board member and what kinds of legal challenges
such membership would entail.”).
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CONCLUSION
The Restatement (Third) of Agency’s definition of personhood is
ripe for reconsideration, and the internal tensions of the definition are an
underexplored area of legal scholarship—despite what appears to be
extensive discussion of AI agency in philosophy. The emergence of AI
computing, and the associated development of truly autonomous
computer systems, will test traditional agency law with questions like
who or what can be a person. These autonomous systems can be persons
in two ways: either as a direct person that is independent or as an indirect
person that is formed by an algorithmic entity. The recognition of
personhood for autonomous systems should be direct and based on the
acceptance that personhood depends on the moral recognition of
autonomy; but, at the very least, recognition of personhood should be
indirect as algorithmic entities under the traditional doctrine.
The recognition of the direct personhood of autonomous systems
requires a fundamental shift in the Restatement’s definition of
personhood. The shift would be from the sole focus on rights and
obligations to a more holistic determination that autonomous judgment
should determine the ability to be a principal and agent. This normative
theoretical shift within the definition is appropriate as the internal
tensions of the traditional analysis are heightened with the rapid
development of new technology. Fortunately, this fundamental shift will
not require the common law to write on a blank slate; the philosophical
analysis of agency can guide the law here.
Indirect personhood for autonomous systems occurs by attaching
them to previously recognized legal entities that fit into the traditional
definitional analysis. In traditional doctrine, the Restatement’s definition
of person attempts to distinguish legally recognized persons from purely
organizational entities and mere instrumentalities. At present, the
Restatement views computer programs as mere instrumentalities of the
using person and thus not a separate person capable of being a principal
or agent. The traditional doctrine also focuses almost exclusively on the
ability to be the object of liabilities and the holder of rights. Thus, the
presence of the recognized legal entity will allow the autonomous
systems to attain indirect personhood. But the reliance of indirect
personhood on organizational law that is easily amendable by the
legislature necessitates analysis of direct personhood for autonomous
systems.
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Ultimately, autonomous systems should be recognized as legal
persons for the purposes of agency law. This acceptance has the potential
for significant knock-on pragmatic benefits, with one such example
being improved corporate decision-making.
There are several downstream implications that are ripe for
future research if autonomous systems are directly or indirectly
recognized as persons. The most critical determination will be deciding
what level of autonomous judgment is enough for personhood. While
this Note clearly accepts that autonomous systems, as defined in Part I,
are on the right side of the line of autonomous judgment, the line must be
drawn somewhere. For computer-related systems, the appropriate line
might be between autonomous and automated systems.132 Overall, this
line-drawing will “highlight how difficult it is to identify machine
consciousness or personhood [and] how uncertain we are about the
boundaries of our own [consciousness and personhood].”133 Other areas
of study include reacting to the inherent risks posed by recognizing the
direct personhood of non-humans or so easily allowing the satisfaction of
personhood by indirect personhood.
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See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
Boyle, supra note 97, at 18.

